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Summary: The paper examines the relationship between neoliberal policies
and the Great Recession with a focus on the persistence of the policy paradigm
in spite of overwhelming evidence of its role in creating the crisis. These eco-
nomic problems are only the latest that have arisen in the wake of the three
long decade experiment with these policy packages. The paper investigates 
the ideological, methodological, historical, theoretical, political and economic
interests underlying the perpetuation of neoliberalism.
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We live in the most extraordinary times. Eric Cantor, the House majority leader talks 
of reversing the crisis “by pursuing a steady repeal of job-destroying regulations” 
(Eric Cantor 2011) rather than the reversing the real cause, job-destroying deregula-
tion. Chancellor Merkel is quoted as saying that “fiscal austerity is the only right way 
to deal with the Euro debt crisis” (Stock Market Today 2012) rather than reversing 
the fiscal austerity that has pushed most European countries into double digit unem-
ployment.  
The global economy continues to falter in the wake of the three decade ex-
periment with neoliberal policies. Yet, the very cause of this crisis, neoliberalism is 
put forward as its solution not only by one of the two main parties in the US but by 
the European Union. Moreover, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) continues to 
push these policy packages as part of the core conditionality associated with crisis 
related loans. The supporters of neoliberalism sound a bit like Alice in Alice in 
Wonderland: “If I had a world of my own, everything would be nonsense. Nothing 
would be what it is because everything would be what it isn't. And contrary-wise; 
what it is it wouldn't be, and what it wouldn't be, it would. You see?”. 
This paper is aimed at generating a conversation about the ideological, meth-
odological, theoretical, political and economic interests behind the perpetuation of 
neoliberalism. The focus is less on the linkage between deregulation and other neo-
liberal policies and the Great Recession which is well documented and more on ex-
plaining the institutionalization of the neoliberal policy paradigm and its conse-
quences.  
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1. Neoliberalism and the Heterogeneity of Its Definitions 
 
Neoliberalism has multiple meanings and definitions. What is most interesting is how 
many different ways it is conceptually represented. David Harvey (2005) defines it as 
“a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can 
best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within 
an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free mar-
kets, and free trade.” To Edward Fullbrook (2006), neoliberalism is an ideology sup-
ported by neoclassical economic theory. To John Williamson (2008), the author of 
the Washington consensus, neoliberalism is nothing more than “the doctrines es-
poused by the Mount Pelerin Society”, the organization founded in 1947 by Hayek 
and his supporters. MacEwan also refers to it as a doctrine “where economic growth 
is maximized and where movement of goods, services and capital not labor are un-
impeded by government regulation” (Arthur MacEwan 2005). 
Others refer to neoliberalism as an “assertion that the market is the core insti-
tution of modern capitalist societies and international politics and policy making are 
(and should be) primarily concerned with making markets work well” (Susanne 
Soederberg, Georg Menz, and Philip G. Cerny 2005). Yet there are still more defini-
tions. “Neoliberalism is a philosophy in which the existence and operation of a mar-
ket are valued in themselves, separately from any previous relationship with the pro-
duction of goods and services, and without any attempt to justify them in terms of 
their effect on the production of goods and services; and where the operation of a 
market or market-like structure is seen as an ethic in itself, capable of acting as a 
guide for all human action, and substituting for all previously existing ethical beliefs” 
(Paul Treanor 2005).  
The referencing of neoliberalism as an ideology, philosophy, doctrine, asser-
tion, and a theory is quite extraordinary. All these have dramatically different infer-
ences. For example, an assertion is seen as a statement or declaration, often without 
support or reason. Contrast that to the notion of philosophy which suggests the study 
of the fundamental nature of knowledge, reality, and existence. One can think of few 
phenomena with such a powerful evocation of heterogenic responses from such a 
wide variety of academic writers. Conceptually it is a strong testimony to how much 
neoliberalism has been globally institutionalized in the Veblenian sense of habits of 
thought common to the generality of men and women.  
However despite the differences there is a common recognition of an affiliated 
policy paradigm which assumes growth and development will arise from the macro-
stabilization, liberalization and privatization of economies. Macrostabilization fo-
cuses on reducing trade deficits, constraining monetary growth and cutting govern-
ment spending and is aimed at reducing imbalances in the current account and gov-
ernment budgets. This has frequently meant pro-cyclical policies or enforcing auster-
ity on governments when economies are in economic downturns. Liberalization re-
tracts state intervention in markets in order to reverse the distortions to the price sig-
nals consumers and private producers need to make “optimal choices”. In addition to 
reducing government regulations, liberalization often means “freeing up” prices by 
removing government controls or subsidies on output prices like food for consumers 
and input prices like fertiliser to farmers. User fees or charges to individuals for util- 
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izing public goods like education and healthcare are introduced to promote “effi-
ciency” in their allocation while raising revenues for governments. Privatization fo-
cuses on selling state assets to the private sector in the belief that private property 
ownership would lead to higher levels of efficiency, investment and growth. Each of 
these policy positions arises from distinct neo-classical economic theories (Howard 
Stein 2008). 
 
2. Neoliberalism and Its Economic and Social Impact 
 
The role of deregulation and related neoliberal policies as a both a source of massive 
financialization of the economy and cause of the Great Recession is widely recog-
nized in the literature (David M. Kotz 2009; Bill Lucarelli 2009; Joseph Stiglitz 
2010; William Tabb 2012). Some authors aptly call it the “crisis of neoliberal capital-
ism” (Kotz 2010).  
This is only the latest example of the fallout that has accompanied the neolib-
eral experiment, though clearly a more profound one (Kosta Josifidis, Alpar Lošonc, 
and Novica Supić 2010; Timur Han Gur, Naci Canpolat, and Huseyin Ozel 2011). 
The past thirty years have witnessed an unprecedented period of economic instabil-
ity, stagnation and growing inequality. Despite the takeoff in China and other Asian 
countries (areas that arguably largely escaped neoliberalism) global growth has 
steadily declined averaging 3.8% in the 70s, 3.3% in the 80s, 3.1% in the 90s and 
most recently between 2000-10 only 2.8% (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) 2011
1). Income inequality has also risen.  
In a total of 27 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries from the mid-80s to the latter part of the first decade of the new 
millennium, the income of the upper quintile grew by 1.9% per year compared to 
only 1.3% for the lowest quintile. In 20 of 22 countries, where data was available the 
gini rose or showed no improvement. The same study also provides data on seven 
emerging countries covering a more recent period from the early 90s to the late 
2000s. Five indicated a clear deterioration in the gini coefficient. South Africa had 
the highest gini at around 0.7 (OECD 2011). The South African trend is in line with 
other countries in Africa, an area that was heavily influenced by decades of neoliber-
alism through structural adjustment lending. In a sample of 19 sub-Saharan Africa 
countries, the gini went from a mean of 43.6 to 48.9 over the adjustment period 
(Stein 2011).  
There are also strong indications that instability has risen. The lucrative nature 
of managing the riches of the world’s wealthy has led to an explosion of hedge funds. 
In 1995, there were 2,800 funds managing $2.8 billion. In 2006 the number was up to 
8,500 with $1.4 trillion in assets (Angel Ubide 2006; IMF 2007). Deregulation has 
attracted hedge fund money into new markets. 
In 2000, the Commodities Future Modernization Act removed restrictions on 
speculation in commodities. This deregulation has increased speculation by hedge 
funds and with it the financialization of commodities including food. Commodity 
                                                        
1 UNCTAD. 2011. On-Line Statistics, UNCTAD STAT. 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx.  
424  Howard Stein 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2012, 4, pp. 421-440 
futures and options went from 10 million contracts at a value of $1 trillion in 2003 to 
70 million contracts valued at $14 trillion in 2010 (UNCTAD 2011). In 2011, for 
example, 61% of the wheat futures market was controlled by speculators compared 
to only 12% in the mid-90s. Overall, there was an estimated doubling of speculative 
money entering into food between 2006 and 2011 (Murray Worthy 2011). By 2011, 
food prices were 2 ½ times the level of 1999 threatening the food security of millions 
of the world’s poorest (Index Mundi 2012
2). In 56 developing countries food prices 
rose by an average of 56% between 2007 and 2010 (Worthy 2011). 
The post 1980 period has also seen a significant rise in banking crisis follow-
ing episodes of financial liberalization. The figure below from Gerard Caprio and 
Deniela Klingebiel (2003) shows a precipitous growth in the number of financial 
crises following the widespread imposition of neoliberalism in the post-1980 period. 
 
 
 
Source: Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). 
 
Figure 1 Episodes of Financial Crises 
 
We can see that the numbers exploded from an average of less than five in the 
latter half of the 1970s to more than 50 in 1995, a period of heavy financial liberali-
zation. Aslit Demirgüç-Kunt and Enrica Detragiache (1998) examine financial crises 
in 53 countries between the 1980 and 1995 and find that it is highly correlated with 
financial liberalization. In their sample, 77% of the banking crises were linked to 
various forms of financial liberalization. Cleaning up these crises has proven ex-
tremely costly. Patric Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) provide information on 27 
countries with financial crisis between 1977 and 1997 and show a fiscal cost of be-
tween 4% and almost 50% of the GDP.  
These figures do not include the opportunity costs arising from foregone eco-
nomic growth and the higher unemployment associated with these crises. In the con-
text of the current crisis there was a more than 6% reversal in world economic 
growth between 2007 and 2009. If global growth in 2008 and 2009 had expanded at 
                                                        
2 Index Mundi. 2012. Commodity Food Price Index, April, 1997-March 2012.  
http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=food-price-index&months=180.  
425  The Neoliberal Policy Paradigm and the Great Recession 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2012, 4, pp. 421-440
the average of 2004 to 2007, the world would have had $607 more per person in 
2009 or a total opportunity cost of around $4.1 trillion dollars (calculated from 
UNCTAD 2011). 
Given the poor statistical base for determining employment figures world-
wide, it is difficult to assess the human implications in terms of people’s employment 
and livelihoods. However the statistics from the European community with its em-
bedded neoliberal policies are staggering. In May, 2012 there was an estimated 24.9 
million unemployed in in 27 EU countries with an unemployment rate of 10.3% up 
from 16 million people and a 6.7% rate in the first quarter of 2008. The situation in 
the 17 Eurozone countries however, where IMF and European conditionality on 
loans have forced countries into severe internal devaluations is far worse. The unem-
ployment rate hit 11.1% % in May 2012 up from 7.6% in 2007. The number of un-
employed jumped to 17.6 million in May, 2012 from 11.8 million in 2007.  
However in some European the countries the situation is more grim with the 
ranks of the unemployed tripling in Ireland, Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania in 2010-11 
and doubling or nearly doubling in places like Spain, Denmark, Cyprus, Portugal, 
Greece and the UK compared to the pre-crisis period (European Commission 2012
3). 
Many of these countries have adopted either IMF or IMF type programs with their 
emphasis on neoliberal procyclical policies (more on this below). This is not surpris-
ing. A survey of studies of IMF programs indicate that they increase unemployment, 
lower economic growth and poverty rates, exacerbate income equality and reduce 
social services (Brian F. Crisp and Michael J. Kelly 1999; Gopal Garuda 2000; 
Adam Przeworski and James R. Vreeland 2000; Barbara Stallings and Wilson Peres 
2000; Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee 2002; Vreeland 2003; Michael J. Kurtz 2004; 
Alex Dreher 2006).  
After the start of the crisis, the Fund argued they would shift from their normal 
position and support an increase in fiscal expenditures to deal with the collapse. This 
is quite explicit in a now widely quoted IMF paper by Antonio Spilimbergo et al. 
(2008).  
They argue that the economic downturn was driven both by a financial crisis 
and the collapse in aggregate demand. They indicate the usual option for addressing 
aggregate demand through devaluations, which is to stimulate exports through mone-
tary policy, was not available. The former because it is a global phenomenon and will 
only lead to competitive devaluations and the latter because it has already been fully 
utilized in many countries or because the financial sectors have become too dysfunc-
tional for it to work. They argue “in these circumstances, the Managing Director of 
the IMF has called for a sizable fiscal response at the global level…” (Spilimbergo et 
al. 2008). 
However studies have contested this. Mark Weisbrot et al. (2009) examine 41 
IMF accords signed in the wake of the economic downturn and find only five with 
any evidence of expansionary fiscal or monetary policy. However, a closer reading of 
the IMF agreements indicates that even this interpretation can be considered gener-
ous (Stein 2010). Evidence is that the Fund is still overwhelmingly procyclical.  
                                                        
3 European Commission. 2012. Eurostat Employment and Unemployment Statistics.  
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/employment_unemployment_lfs/data/database.  
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How and why do these policies persist in view of their dismal record? This 
will be the focus of the remainder of the paper. 
 
3. Neoliberalism and Its Continuities 
 
To understand the hegemonic influence of the neoliberal policy paradigm over more 
than three decades, one needs to analyze the forces behind its institutionalization and 
perpetuation. The commitment to the paradigm cannot be singularly reduced to ide-
ology. The paradigm has been woven into the basic fabric of our society, polity and 
economy. It is in consonance with the core propositions of the economics that has 
come to dominate the mainstream of the economics profession. Neoliberal policies 
are not the only ones that can arise from neoclassical economics. However, there is a 
close homology between the imbued naturalism of neoclassical economic markets 
and the vision embedded in the neoliberal policy order. 
There are five main constructs at the heart of neo-classical economics that also 
underlie neoliberalism: homo-economicus, methodological individualism, the accep-
tance of equilibrium as a natural state, rational deductivity, and axiomatic reasoning. 
First, at the heart of all the theories is homo-economicus, which posits a rationally calcu-
lating individual, who naturally seeks to maximize his or her welfare. This concept in-
corporates a mode of rationality, which is instrumental, where an actor makes choices 
that will best satisfy his/her utility in a manner which does not take into account the util-
ity of others (eg. completely abstracting from human beings as social actors). 
This model relies entirely on the second core sub-component, methodological 
individualism. The starting point of decision-making is at the individual level, and 
the end point is the individual. In the economy, there are assumed to be two types of 
participants: consumers and producers. A consumer chooses bundles of goods, which 
maximize his or her utility; however, choices are subject to budget constraints. Firms 
(seen as simply groupings of rational individuals) make production choices, which 
simply means that they choose the efficient bundle of inputs and outputs that will 
maximize the firm’s profits. In this world, choices are simple because their future 
implications are understood; additionally, all technology types are readily available 
and information is costless. There is also perfect competition, which ensures that 
profits are zero, or that a firm only earns enough to cover its costs. 
Still, what is missing in the analysis is the mechanism of producers and consumer 
interaction, which leads to choices which are welfare maximizing. Markets, in this con-
text, are perceived as exchanges where goods and services are transferred from produc-
ers to consumers. Exchange in the neo-classical model arises spontaneously from the 
atomistic interaction of self-seeking individuals. Goods traded in every market are as-
sumed to be homogenous so that prices provide the only information needed to make the 
decisions on production and purchasing. No individual has sufficient market power to 
affect the market price.  
Finally, to ensure that equilibrium is reached in the economy as a whole, neo-
classical theory posits the existence of a “Walrasian auctioneer” who gathers and proc-
esses information from all these markets so that all individual agents through a tatonne-
ment, or groping process, can adjust their decisions to remove excess demand and sup-
ply from all markets. The result will be that Pareto Optimal conditions will be reached,  
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thereby maximizing the welfare of society. Pareto optimality occurs when no one will 
be able to be better off without making someone worse off.  
Equilibrium arises in the sense that the market is clearing and optimal choices are 
made. Moreover, in this ideal world, unfettered markets normally will lead to indicators 
that reflect scarcity and choice. Decisions based on markets under these conditions will 
lead to efficient choices on what and how to produce that are indicative of the endow-
ment of societal resources. Thus the outcome is consistent with the natural underlying 
conditions. In short, equilibrium is a natural state. 
The final two sub-components of neo-classical theory relate to the manner in 
which the above assumptions are created; the thinking behind the models is rational de-
ductive and axiomatic. It is rational deductive in the sense that the behavior of agents is 
predetermined by a set of rules which are deductively posited. Rational, predictable be-
havior is simply assumed to arise from a set of market signals. There is no argument for 
why this must be true; it is simply deduced. Axiomatically, consumers and private pro-
ducers are presupposed to be utility and profit maximizers that rationally respond in an 
efficient manner, if the market signals are correct. However, states do not operate with 
the same constraints on human behaviour because they do not respond to market signals. 
This vision of markets and states by neoclassical economics has become ubiqui-
tous. The way that economic knowledge has been disseminated and reproduced for 
many decades has had a powerful affirming role for neoliberalism. If this is how 
markets operate, the public sector must be the source of any economic dislocation or 
crisis best addressed with neoliberal policy choices. 
The ability to conflate neoclassical economics with the study of economies has 
delimited the domain of policy debate. Neoclassical economics has everywhere been 
able to detach itself from contextual relativity by generating ahistoricity. The teach-
ing of history of economic thought and methodology once a staple of any under-
graduate education (including my own) has been jettisoned from the curriculum for 
decades. Over time diversity has been lost as adherence to a core set of axioms and 
defined techniques demonstrated through publication in a few tightly controlled jour-
nals that has helped determine the process of hiring and promotion. 
Economist today have become “paradigm warriers” seeking to establish their 
way of looking at the world as the only legitimate option (Fullbrook 2006). Much 
like the Catholic Church of the middle ages, those questioned the neoclassical ontol-
ogy and epistemology are categorized as heterodox, today’s equivalent of heretical.  
The classification allowed much of the profession and policy circles to largely 
ignore the prognostications of people like Dean Baker concerning the relationship 
between financial deregulation and our current economic crisis. In an interview 
(dated Jan 9, 2009) with the Associated Press’s Deb Reichmann,  Vice President 
Cheney repeatedly insisted that no one anticipated the looming U.S. financial crisis. 
“I don’t think anybody saw it coming”, he said (quoted in Economic Predictions 
2012). 
Among the mainstream economists financial deregulation was being hailed as 
the great savior of capitalism. For example, Bruce Bartlett called Rajan and Zingales 
2003 book Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists: Unleashing the Power of Finan-
cial Markets to Spread Wealth and Opportunity, “one of the most powerful defences  
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of the free market ever written” (Chicago Booth Management Conference 2012). 
Between 2003 and 2006 Rajan was Director of Research and Economic Counsellor at 
the IMF before joining the University of Chicago Business School.  
Sadly, economic education has become inculcation. Even one or two introduc-
tory classes in economics is sufficient to lay a foundation of constructs that stylizes a 
student’s understanding of the operation of markets and states. These constructs are 
buttressed by the daily popularized mainstream discourses of the media that sustains 
and reproduces neoliberal style representations of economic reality.  
Policy paradigms can be supported in other important ways best understood in 
a broader political economy framework. Ideas, theories and policies arising in the 
social sciences don’t ineluctably percolate to the surface to dominate based on their 
mere cogency. Powerful interests commit financial resources to potential progenitors 
aimed at planting the seeds of the intellectual development of agenda supporting con-
structs. Once germinated, ideas and theories are carefully fertilized until they begin 
to bear fruit. Private foundations, large corporations and international, political and 
military organizations throw in their support once the instrumental value of an 
agenda becomes more widely recognized in turn contributing to the institutionaliza-
tion of a new set of policy ideas. This very much is the story of neoliberalism. 
 
4. The Sexus, Nexus and Plexus of Neoliberalism: The University 
of Chicago 
 
While laissez faire dates back to the 17
th century French traditions (physiocrats and 
others) and was later used by 19
th century British economists like Mill and Bentham, 
it was largely discredited in the wake of the Gt. Depression. However, a new some-
what more pernicious form arose in the early post-war period. At the center were 
developments at the University of Chicago. Efforts there are best captured by Henry 
Miller’s titles of his famous trilogy of books published between 1948 and 1960. 
Sexus is the period of early liaisons central to the early thinking of ideas and phi-
losophies. Plexus is a physiological term which refers to the creation of links neces-
sary to the formation of a full corpus and nexus the connections that arise that allows 
the full corpus to flourish and influence.  
Other universities also played a role in building neoliberalism. Fullbrook 
(2006) points to support for graduate and post-graduate education from the US Air 
Force and Rand Corporation of the Universities of California, Harvard, Stanford, 
Yale, Columbia and Princeton along with Chicago in line with their aim of encourag-
ing mathematical economics and general equilibrium theory. Over time faculty from 
these department along with MIT which was heavily supported by the Pentagon took 
over the most prestigious journals which were used for appointments and promotion. 
Their graduates also tended to dominate the staff of the IMF and World Bank where 
the neoliberal model came to dominate.  
However, it is difficult to exaggerate the role of the University of Chicago in 
the formation, development, application and dissemination of neoliberalism. It was 
this school that systematically trained Chilean economists in the 1950s and 60s who 
first created a state in a neoliberal image following the Pinochet coup of 1973 (Har-
vey 2005).   
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However, before recounting this history it should be emphasized that other 
branches of neoclassical economics helped lay the ground work for neoliberalism. 
The depiction of economies as generating 19
th century physics style equilibrium and 
stability following the work of Walras, Jevons and Fisher, the price marginal utility 
relationship of Carl Menger and the associated market legitimizing consumer sover-
eignty of Von Mises (see his “Human Action: A Treatise on Economics”), the 
Cowles Commission and its program encouraging econometrics, Rand corpora-
tion/US military and its financial support and promotion of Arrow-Debreu style Wal-
rasian general equilibrium with the pretentious “proofs” of the uniqueness, existence 
and stability of equilibrium and the Hicks-Samuleson-Hansen gutting of Keynes 
message of instability and disequilibrium replaced by their static equilibrium frame-
work (IS-LM curves). All of these contributed to an ideation of markets that demobi-
lized the common sense notion that activist states were absolutely central to the func-
tioning of a healthy mixed economy while promoting the market as a symbol of the 
apotheosis of human existence (Fullbrook 2006). 
The story in Chicago begins with the 1934 publication of the U. of Chicago 
economist Henry Simon’s “A Positive Program for Laissez Faire”. Despite its title, 
this was not an extremist call for a laissez faire approach. In fact Simon called for the 
nationalization of industries which were too monopolistic.  
However, he affirmed the ideal of the competitive market and fully supported 
a hands off approach when the conditions were present. He also provided the intel-
lectual basis of Friedman’s later work on monetarism through his recommendation 
for a stable monetary rule for central banks. This was more fully developed in his 
1948 book “Economic Policy for a Free Society”.  
Friedman acknowledged this in his 1967 lecture on “The Monetary Theory 
and Policy of Henry Simons” where he pointed to Simon’s idea “that monetary sta-
bility is an essential prerequisite for economic stability” which called for the “estab-
lishment of a simple mechanical rule of monetary policy” (Milton Friedman 1967, p. 
2). Simon who had close ties to the president of the University of Chicago, Robert 
Hutchins heavily promoted the hiring of Milton Friedman who joined the economics 
faculty in Spring, 1946. 
At the same time, Simon was committed to building a policy focused institute 
at the university which would be built around the libertarian philosophy of the Chi-
cago economics department. He laid out a 20 year vision of publications of scholarly 
and popular literature, facilitating academic discussions, bringing libertarian visiting 
professors to Chicago and influencing economic policy, political action and profes-
sional opinions in three memos. Simon was also instrumental in promoting Hayek at 
Chicago. Simon and Hayek developed a close friendship following Simon’s 1934. 
Simon referred to Hayek’s conservative tract “Road to Serfdom” as a “magnificent 
contribution” (quoted in Robert Van Horn and Philip Mirowski 2005). Partly due to 
Simon’s connections, Hayek was approached by Harold Luthnow in Chicago in 1945 
during a first US speaking tour about writing an American version of the “Road to 
Serfdom”.  
Luthnow was a wealthy businessman who set up the Volker Fund to support 
economic research with a laissez faire orientation. The Volker Fund sponsored  
430  Howard Stein 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2012, 4, pp. 421-440 
Hayek’s 1946 speaking tour of the US. Hayek proposed organizing a “Free Market 
Project” at the University of Chicago which would be devoted to developing a US 
version of the “Road to Serfdom” Hayek was instrumental in getting Luthnow to 
fund the project in the wake of the 1946 suicide of Simon. In the end Luthnow 
agreed to provide nearly $100,000 or well over a million in today’s dollars. Luthnow 
and the Volker Fund also financed the Hayek’s Mount Pelerin Society in Switzerland 
in 1947 and the formation of the MPS branch in Chicago in 1948 under the leader-
ship of a group that included Friedman. Among other things the focus of the MPS 
was on the redefinition of the functions of the state to more clearly distinguish be-
tween totalitarian and the liberal order, reestablishing the rule of law to ensure that 
individual and groups are not capable of encroaching on the freedom of others, the 
establishment of standards that are not inimical to the initiative and functioning mar-
kets and the creation of international order permitting the establishment of harmoni-
ous economic relations. Hayek joined the faculty of the U. of Chicago in 1950.  
In the end, the equivalent of the American Road “Capitalism and Freedom” 
was produced not by the Project but by Milton Friedman in 1962. It was based on a 
series of lectures he presented in 1956 (Van Horn and Mirowski 2005). It went fur-
ther than anything Hayek could have done in promoting neoliberalism by glorifying 
economic freedom as an end in itself, in calling for the privatization of education, 
blaming monopolies on government policy and dismissing the consequences when 
linked to patents and property rights, by reducing the role of government to the basic 
function of guaranteeing property rights, stability of the money supply and law and 
order only, by promoting the simple-minded bifurcation of the world into a coerced 
central planning approach vs. the much preferred “voluntary” approach of the free 
market, by making the argument that economic freedom is a “necessary condition” 
for political freedom, by stressing the idea that no coercion can exist in the market 
place as long as buyers and sellers have choices, by rhetorically arguing that anyone 
opposed to the free market must be opposed to freedom itself, and by supporting 
economic inequality as an important mechanism for maintaining freedom because it 
concentrates resources which can be used to promote the cause of freedom. By 2002 
more than half a million copies were sold worldwide (Friedman 2002).  
However, Friedman’s passionate commitment to the popularization of neolib-
eralism went well beyond this. In 1980, he produced the PBS series “Free to Choose” 
and a book of the same name co-authored with his wife Rose. In the 1990 issue of a 
new edition he celebrated the times and his influence: “What appeared to many read-
ers of the book in 1980 as utopian and unrealistic will appear to many readers as al-
most a blueprint for change. The tide has turned but it is still far from the flood 
needed to assure a bright future for human freedom” (Friedman and Rose Friedman 
1990). “Free to Choose” was the top selling non-fiction book of 1980 and sold over 
one million copies in the US. It was also translated into 17 languages. In Japan, 
alone, the original 1980 edition sold more than 200,000 copies (Friedman and Fried-
man 1999).  
While working on the popular front to build “habits of thought” in favour of 
neoliberalism, Friedman was also very active on the professional front not only in 
organizing the University of Chicago School of economics but in imprinting a meth- 
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odology on the economics profession which demobilized challenges to neoliberalism. 
The later occurred in the wake of the highly influential volume “Essays in Positive 
Economics” which helped build on and popularize Neville Keynes’s notion of posi-
tive vs. normative economics. In the volume, Friedman was unequivocal in his ar-
gument that positive economics “can be an objective science in precisely the same 
sense as any of the physical sciences” and is “independent of any particular ethical 
position or normative judgement” (Friedman 1953, p. 2).  
What was crucial in laying the foundation for his form and other forms of 
neoclassical economics was his infamous “Alice in Wonderland” comment that “in 
general, the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions” (op. 
cit., p. 8). While, all assumptions lack realism in the sense that they do not cover all 
aspects of reality there are many ways to test the power and usefulness of assump-
tions (Uskali Maki 1994). Friedman’s extreme position removes arguments about 
assumptions from debate by emphasizing that they can only be tested by the predic-
tive power of theories that arise from the assumptions.  
The axiomatic approach of neoclassical economics is further justified by his 
promotion of theory as tautology “designed to abstract essential features of complex 
reality.” Friedman makes the following comment “As already noted, tautologies have 
an extremely important place in economics and other sciences as a specialized lan-
guage or ‘analytical filling system’ aimed at organizing and interpreting empirical 
material” (Friedman 1953, p. 4, p. 6).  
Friedman was also instrumental in creating a protective belt around neoclassi-
cal economics. In Lakatosian terms the idea of a protective belt is where economists 
rely on a core set of irrefutable metaphysical propositions, positive and negative heu-
ristics concerning the selection of tools and questions and theories, empirical conven-
tions and auxiliary hypotheses whose rejection does not threaten the basic core 
propositions. In particular, Friedman argues that the test of a theory is only if it 
“yields sufficiently accurate predictions” (op. cit., p. 9). The methodological coup de 
grace for critics of neoliberalism came with one last dimension “any policy conclu-
sions necessarily rest on the prediction of doing one thing rather than another, a pre-
diction that must be based… on positive economics” (op. cit., p. 2).  
This moved economics into the realm of empirics away from the basic argu-
ments about the core propositions of neoclassical economics which underlie neolib-
eral policies and which ineluctably follow a set of axioms based on faulty notions of 
human behaviour. Agents are presupposed as rational actors responding in predict-
able ways to market signals. The key is to ensure that the signals are correct which 
can best arise in the unfettered privatized world. A crucial component that helped 
pave the way for neoliberalism was added by Chicago graduate James Buchanon’s 
work on public choice which applied the same axioms on human behaviour to the 
state. This allowed “Neo-liberalism (to) transcends the classical liberal tension be-
tween the self-interested agent and the patriotic duty of the citizen by reducing both 
state and market to the identical flat ontology of the neoclassical model of the econ-
omy” (Van Horn and Mirowski 2005). 
The Nobel award in economics has also played a central role in anointing the 
Chicago school of economics. The award which for many years was under the con- 
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trol of the conservative economist Assar Lindbeck heavily rewarded the Chicago 
school. Roughly 40% of the 70 prizes awarded in economics from 1969 to 2011 have 
gone to faculty, former faculty or students with degrees from the University of Chi-
cago. Lindbeck awarded 15 of these when he was on the Nobel committee between 
1969 and 1994. The award was a creation of the Swedish Central Bank in the 1960s 
not Alfred Nobel who detested economists. However it allowed winners to preten-
tiously compare themselves to Albert Einstein and other true Nobel laureates and 
helped bring legitimacy to theories that have led to human retrogression not emanci-
pation (Fullbrook 2006). 
By the early 1980s, neo-classical economics had come to dominate the eco-
nomics departments of most major universities in the US. Retiring Institutionalists, 
post-Keynesians and Marxists economist were not replaced. Critical reflection on 
methodology and the historical transformation of economic thought was discouraged 
and all but disappeared. Over time, emphasis was placed on form (mathematical 
models and increasingly sophisticated econometrics) not content and driven by a 
fundamental commitment to a core set of neoclassical axioms which buttressed the 
neoliberal vision of the operation of markets. The training of Ph.D.s from abroad in 
American and Western European universities extended neoclassical economics to 
every corner of the globe and demobilized any resistance to the neoliberal paradigm 
when it arrived. The same type of economics came to dominate the policy thinking 
inside the World Bank and IMF which became the global purveyors of the neoliberal 
policy paradigm through their loan conditionality in places like Africa (Stein 2008).  
 
5. Africa and the Neoliberal Project 
 
In the context of Africa’s three decade long experiment, neoliberalism achieved a 
meta-development status on the continent where all terms of discussion were set 
within the policy paradigm parameters. Neoliberalism lost its relativity as a single 
model of development and transitioned from the normalizing to the normative (Gra-
ham Harrison 2010).  
Neoliberalism became embedded through the conduct¸ habits, and repertoire 
of development policy practice. Conduct implies the constitution of universal pro-
gressivism or a teleology. There is good and bad conduct and neoliberal practice is 
good conduct that will lead to a higher purpose or telos. Emphasis was always on 
outcomes not the method used to achieve the outcomes. In the initial phases, neolib-
eralism often invoked resistance and concerted efforts were used to overcome oppo-
sition. Expediency was achieved through executive orders. Debate was limited. It 
was not unusual to see “stroke of the pen” approaches to liberalizing exchange rates, 
removing food subsidies or abolishing marketing boards with little or no open debate 
in legislatures or public discussion. Over time good conduct began to focus on issues 
of sequencing, some social safety nets and good governance with its focus on trans-
parency, accountability and the rule of law. Conduct went from mere consequential-
ism to a form of individual behaviour based on the neoliberal ideal of a motivated 
and efficient market agent (Harrison 2010). 
Habit implies progress through repeated action. Habituated forms of neoliberal 
behavior arise through repeated and rewarded practice in the polity, economy and  
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society. In the initial phases neoliberal practices were largely extrinsic and imposed 
through external pressures often contributing to a climate of unstable elections, pro-
test and economic crisis. Over time, multiparty political elections focused on which 
group could become better custodians of the neoliberal state and social engineering 
rather than who could provide alternatives to neoliberalism. Either new parties were 
elected on neoliberal platforms (Malawi and Zambia) or there were shift in the lead-
ership of existing parties (Tanzania and Ghana) allowing for a greater mainstreaming 
of the neoliberal agenda. Increasingly emphasis was on depoliticizing decision mak-
ing and creating the illusion that neoliberalism was scientific and technical (Harrison 
2010). This was greatly assisted by donor funded training and retraining of econo-
mists in neoclassical economics through efforts like the African Economic Research 
Consortium in Nairobi. 
Repertoire has involved bundles of practice which have aimed at destabilizing 
existing habits and replacing them with neoliberal behaviour. Deviations from neo-
liberal practices were punished with the freezing of tranches of foreign lending. 
Gradually repertoires were developed that would better ensure the continuity of aid 
flows. Consultants and civil servants increasingly incorporated the language of neo-
liberalism into their daily practices and lexicon (Harrison 2010). Repetition of prac-
tice created generalized habits of thought of neoliberalism. These were not passive 
entities but constructs that increasingly were invoked to connect actors to the grow-
ing neoliberal order. Their generality allowed for increased coordination, unity of 
purpose and greater behavioral certainty. Arguably, there was a determined effort by 
international agencies to deliberately promote shared ideologies, theories and con-
cepts. 
Capacity building projects and training became ubiquitous and included the 
hiring of outside consultants by the World Bank and donors who had the requisite 
theory and ideology. In 2002, for example, the conservative consultancy group Adam 
Smith International undertook a large capacity building project in the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade in Tanzania aimed at training to design a competitiveness policy 
for the Ministry. As part of a project examining “ownership” for SIDA, we inter-
viewed a number of ministry officials in 2002 in Dar who had participated in the 
training and were astounded by the neo-liberal views of officials including anti-
industrial policy comments like “governments should never chose winners” and 
“growth is best achieved through low and uniform tariffs”. There is little doubt that 
this form of training helped ease officials into the habits and repertoires of neoliberal 
practices inside the Ministry. 
Perhaps most important to the World Bank and IMF’s neoliberal agenda in 
Africa was the creation of a “fifth column” of economists inside African countries. 
The near-collapse of African universities in the 80s and the allocation of large donor 
funds for “domestically” generated research projects in the name of capacity building 
created huge incentives for African academics to engage in the discourse of neoliber-
alism. Increasingly academics supplemented their university salaries with consultan-
cies to produce donor financed reports on subjects of importance to donors at the 
expense of research on extant development problems contributing to what some au-
thors refer to as an internal brain drain (Johnson Ishengoma 2007).  
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In the wake of the Great Recession, the power and influence of the World Bank 
and IMF sponsored neoliberal policies have now spread into Europe with the full coop-
eration and encouragement of the European community. Neoliberalism is already well 
entrenched in the habits, repertoires and conduct inside the European Central Bank, 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and other European institutions 
including many mainstream political parties (Christoph Herman 2007). There are few 
economics departments in European universities promoting anything but neoclassical 
economics. The arrival of the IMF further buttresses the institutionalization of neoliber-
alism on the continent. 
 
6. Neoliberalism, the IMF, Europe and the Great Recession 
 
The IMF loan to Latvia provides a typical example of the nature and impact of their 
programs in Europe and the continued IMF commitment to the neoliberal order. In 
January, 2009, Latvia received a Euro 1.7 billion standby loan from the IMF as part 
of a Euro 7.5 billion package of funds which included Euro 3.1 from the European 
Community and the rest from other European sources and the World Bank. At the 
same as the IMF was pointing to its flexibility, the NY Times ran articles on the 
“draconian measures” being imposed on countries like Latvia. The conditionality 
included a massive 25% cut in public sector wages in 2009, and a huge front loaded 
reduction in the lower the expected deficit from 12% to 5% of GDP, one-third from 
tax increases (regressive VAT and excise taxes) and two-thirds from across the board 
massive 25% cut in real spending (IMF 2009). 
By the beginning of the downturn in 2007 through the end of 2009, the econ-
omy plummeted by 24. 1% second only to the Great Depression of the US in terms 
of economic collapses. Unemployment rose from 5.3% in 2007 to 20.5% in early 
2010. Inclusion of the discouraged workers and part-time employment who would 
prefer to work full-time raised the rate to 30.1%. The situation was exacerbated by 
the high level of foreign currency loans (estimated at 89% of the total) and the 
agreement not to devalue the currency. The result has been an approach referred to as 
internal devaluation aimed at creating brutal labor market conditions with high levels 
of unemployment leading to the lowering of wages and hence an increase in competi-
tiveness. In 2011, Latvia experienced some positive growth leading to neo-classical 
economists like Anders Aslund to declare Latvia as the model of how financial crises 
should be resolved (quoted in Weisbrot and Ray). However, through 2012 unem-
ployment was still well above 15% (European Commission 2012). As Weisbrot and 
Ray (2011) point out at the current rate of recovery, it will take until 2016 just to get 
to the pre-crisis peak. 
In the Eurozone, IMF and European loans to Greece, Portugal and Ireland 
have involved a similar neoliberal strategy of generating internal devaluations with 
terrible implications to employment levels and the standard of living of the popula-
tion. In Portugal unemployment went from 8.5% in 2008 to 15.2% % in 2012. In 
Greece unemployment reached 22.5% in 2012 up from 7.7%. Still the IMF and the 
European community demanded and got a huge increase in austerity including a 22% 
cut in the minimum wage and the layoff of 150,00 additional government workers by 
2015 (New York Times 2012).  
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In Ireland, the unemployment rate reached 14.8% in 2012 up from 4.6% in 
2007 and 11.9 % in 2009 (European Commission 2012). However, the rate would 
have been much higher except for an estimated emigration of around 25,000 in 2010 
and 40,000 people in 2011. Meanwhile the NY Times was reporting that leaders like 
Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy were pointing to Ireland as an “excellent exam-
ple” and “almost out of the crisis” (New York Times 2011). Similarly the press re-
lease of the IMF’s end of February, 2012 fifth review was singing praises of the great 
Irish achievements of their program which were not only tackling the deficit but 
solving unemployment and growth problems (IMF 2012). 
Even without the IMF, the European governments have internalized IMF poli-
cies (Gary Dymski 2011). In Spain, unemployment hit 24.6% in May, 2012. In July, 
2012, the government passed a package of neoliberal policies including a rise in 
VAT, cuts in unemployment benefits, civil service salaries and bonuses, privatization 
of state enterprises, and administrative reforms. In total the austerity package is esti-
mated at 65 billion Euros (Yahoo 2012). On March, 2, 2012, all but two (Czech Re-
public and the UK) of the 27 European countries signed the new pact to tighten 
budget discipline further entrenching neoliberalism on the continent.  
While some critics of orthodox policy believe that this crisis will lead to sig-
nificant changes in prudential, macro, monetary and global monetary institutions 
(Phillip A. O’Hara 2011), others believe along the lines of this paper, that the recov-
ery of the global economy has become dimmer as governments falsely believe that 
the solution to the current crisis is “fixing broken neoliberal mechanisms” (Dymski 
2011, p. 1).  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Along the lines suggested by Fulbrook documenting the impact of neoliberalism is 
not enough. We must understand the historical source and perpetuation of what he 
refers to as an “intellectual poison”. Toward that purpose, the paper has reviewed 
some of the ideological, methodological, theoretical, historical, political and eco-
nomic interests behind the institutionalization and perpetuation of neoliberalism in 
the face of an economic crisis that has been clearly caused by these policies. Among 
other things, neoliberalism has been a source of huge profits for finance capital 
through its encouragement of the financialization of the economy. The ability to so-
cialize the risk from the ensuing collapse with virtual impunity while keeping profits 
has provided a powerful constituency supporting the perpetuation of neoliberal poli-
cies both domestically and globally.  
In the United States, massive financial support to political candidates support-
ing the neoliberal agenda is a strong indicator of their instrumentality in perpetuating 
wealth and inequality. The 2010 Supreme Court ruling “Citizens United” removed all 
restrictions on donations to political action committees (now known as Super PACs) 
from individuals, corporations and unions.  
This does not bode well for the 2012 and future elections. The two conserva-
tive industrialists, the Koch brothers, that organize meetings twice a year of the 
wealthiest in the US to support conservative Republican candidates have a net worth  
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of an estimated $25 billion dollars each. The total net worth of just a handful of the 
richest donors to Republican causes including the Koch brothers exceeds $175 bil-
lion (Koch brothers, Walton Family, Sheldon Adelson, Rupert Murdoch and Harold 
Simmons (Forbes Magazine 2012)). Spending just 1% of their net worth would place 
nearly $2 billion dollars into the coffers of the Republican PACs. These numbers do 
not seem so preposterous. One former Romney aide running the pro-Republican Su-
per PAC American Crossroads will raise an estimated $400 million during the 2012 
campaign (Nicholas Confessore 2012). This does not include the activities of dozens 
of other pro-Republican Super PACs and other conservative policy advocate groups. 
This kind of “investment” by the wealthy could certainly be justified given the poten-
tial payoff from neoliberal policies including curtailing social spending to finance tax 
cuts, privatizing social security by handing over its management to Wall Street and 
deregulating finance, environmental and labour laws.  
The wealthy are also the big winner in Europe. Risk has been socialized 
through IMF and EU loans which are used to support the payments to bank and other 
private holders of debt and to rescue banks from poor loan portfolios. The social and 
economic functions of states are truncated so they can assume new debt obligations, 
while assets are privatized to generate additional revenue. Wages have been cut and 
labour markets have been deregulated leading to a rise in potential profits.  
Developments in the economics profession have also clearly been a central 
dimension of the story. Many neoclassical economists would not openly consider 
themselves to be proponents of neoliberal policies or the Chicago school of econom-
ics. Yet this raises the question of why there is not a stronger push for an alternative 
theoretical paradigm. There is little doubt that most economists today are not meth-
odologically self-conscious and are largely embedded in the world of marginal theo-
retical verification (not rejection) using increasingly complicated econometrics. 
There is little to be gained career-wise from empirical debates that challenge neolib-
eral policies. Alexander Rosenberg (1994) argues there are other reasons economists 
continue to use cognitively weak core propositions which form the basis of neoliber-
alism. For normative reasons, the assumptions underlying the neoclassical model are 
very attractive since they lead to the elegant world of how self-interest ought to lead 
to a coherent disposition of resources.  
Moreover, like the Euclidian world that dominated the science of space for so 
long, economists have gone about their mathematical business without thinking 
about the cognitive status of economic theory. “They have treated microeconomics as 
a pure axiomatic system whose terms may or may not be instantiated in the real 
world, but which is of great interest, like Euclidiean geometry, whether or not its ob-
jects actually exist” (p. 229). At the same time they have been active as paradigm 
warriors defending their type of economics as the only legitimate approach. This 
does not bode well for those hoping that the Great Recession will lead economists to 
challenge the core propositions that underlie neoliberalism. 
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